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The 'All-Holder-Best Price' Rule: Executive Compensation
Agreements and Their Place in Tender Offers
John Mueller'
I. INTRODUCTION
Should one's position, or lack thereof, within a target company af-
fect the level of compensation received in the event of a tender offer?
This question has spawned countless arguments within the legal and
business communities. Both the courts and legislature of the United
States have undertaken efforts to provide a solution.2 However, it is
the inconsistent application of these regulations through a myriad of
judicial tests that requires examination.
Included in the 1968 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 3 the "all-holder-best price rule" (the
"AHBPR") 4 and its application in business, litigation have created ex-
1. J.D. from DePaul University College of Law expected May 2003; Vanderbilt University,
B.A., 2000.
2. See generally Michael A. Lawson & Daryl W. Hall, Measuring the Feasibility of a Tender
Offer, 8/27/01 L.A. Bus. J. 49 (2001) (analyzing the effect of the decision in Katt v. Titan Acquisi-
tions, Ltd. with respect to prior cases and statutory regulations).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988).
4. The AHBPR is regarded as one rule, but actually combines the requirements of both
§ 14(d)(7) and § 14(d)(10) of the Exchange Act:
Under Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10, also known as the 'all-holder-best price'
rule:
(a) No bidder shall make a tender offer unless:
(1) The tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of securities subject
to the tender offer; and
(2) The consideration paid to any security holder pursuant to the tender offer is
the highest consideration paid to any other security holder during such tender
offer.
McMichael v. United States Filter Corp., 2001 WL 418981, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2001) (quot-
ing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10).
Section 14(d)(7) prohibits a tender offeror from offering different consideration to dif-
ferent shareholders for the same shares and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer or request or invitation fro
tenders before the expiration thereof by increasing the consideration offered to holders
of such securities, such person shall pay the increased consideration to each security
holder whose securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the tender offer or re-
quest or invitation for tenders whether or not such securities have been taken up by
such person before the variation of the tender offer or request or invitation.
Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7).
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tensive controversy and variance within the courts.5 Originally
adopted as a mechanism to insure equal treatment of all shareholders
in the event of a tender offer, courts have interpreted the AHBPR's
current purpose and application in vastly different manners.6 The
courts have used essentially three distinct tests in their analysis of ac-
tions brought under the AHBPR; each test interprets the AHBPR to
have a particular reach in its control of tender offers.7
The recent decision in Katt v. Titan Acquisitions8 marks a unique
development in the AHBPR's interpretation. 9 Rather than following
one of the already developed tests, the Katt court chose to adopt a test
that combined aspects of the other tests.'0 The decision has caused a
great amount of uncertainty within the business community and, in
particular, with those companies who engage, or wish to engage, in
any form of merger or acquisition within which a tender offer may be
involved.1
This paper will analyze the conflicting interpretations of the
AHBPR within the context of tender offers and propose a solution
that will ensure identical application of the rules throughout the coun-
try and at every level of the judicial system. Part II provides a thor-
ough statutory and judicial history of the AHBPR's application in
several landmark cases, including Katt.'2 Part III examines the vary-
ing effects of the different tests and the manner in which they control
court rulings.13 Part IV proposes a new approach for the courts,
namely adoption of the Bright Line Test, and discusses the reasons for
its adoption-consistency and certainty in business decisions, without
having to worry about which district one is in.14
5. See Charles M. Nathan, Jeffrey L. Rothschild, Melissa Rubin, & Greg Nowak, Providing
Certainty in the Uncertain World of Telecom Deal Making, 1263 PLI/Corp 173, 184-185 (2001).
6. See generally Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638-644 (M.D. Tenn. 2000)
(examining prior decisions involving the AHBPR and the judicial tests implemented by the re-
spective Circuits).
7. See infra Parts II.B, lI.C, II.D.
8. 133 F. Supp. 2d 632 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
9. Michael Lawson, Employee Benefit Plans in an Acquisition Context, 510 PLI/Tax 571, 581
(2001). See discussion infra Part II.E.
10. The Court in Katt chose to adopt both the 'integral part of the tender offer' and 'func-
tional' tests of the Second and Ninth Circuits. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
11. "Executive compensation arrangements negotiated in contemplation of a corporate trans-
action are a common occurrence in the mergers and acquisitions arena. But a recent federal case
out of the middle district of Tennessee (Katt) has the potential to scare away many of those who
would otherwise test these waters." 8/27/02 L.A. Bus. J. at 49.
12. See infra Part II. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 632.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
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II. BACKGROUND
In order to best understand the importance of the AHBPR, it is
essential that one be knowledgeable of its history and its treatment
within the American judicial system. Part A discusses the AHBPR's
origin, statutory development, and eventual adoption by the SEC.15
Part B examines the Second Circuit's decision in Field v. Trump16 and
introduces the Functional Test.17 Part C examines the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Epstein v. MCA 8 and introduces the Integral Part Test. 19
Part D examines the Seventh Circuit's decision in Lerro v. Quaker
Oats Co. 20 and introduces the Bright Line Test.21 Part E examines the
decision in Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Ltd.22 and introduces the Com-
bined Test, which incorporates elements of both the Integral Part and
Functional Tests. 23
A. Williams Act and the Tender Offer
In 1968, the United States Congress enacted the Williams Act, 24
which served as an amendment to the Exchange Act.25 By the time
Senator Harrison Williams reintroduced the Act in 1967, virtually all
of the major stock exchanges supported its passage. 26 This consensus
was made possible only through a series of extensive revisions in the
drafting of the Act, because when first introduced in 1965 the legisla-
tion was avidly pro-management. 27 However, in 1967 the Exchange
Act reflected a much more neutral approach; Senator Williams even
noted Congress's efforts to maintain a balance of power between
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. 850 F.2d 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
17. See infra Part n.B.
18. 50 F.3d 644 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. 84 F.3d 239 (N.D. I11. 1996).
21. See infra Part lI.D.
22. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 632.
23. See infra Part II.E.
24. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811
(1988).
25. The Williams Act added § 13(d)-(e) and § 14(d)-(f) to the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-7811 (1988).
26. William C. Tyson, The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the Regula-
tion of Tender Offers, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 241, 250 n.47 (1990). (citing to Congressional
Record regarding the support of the various major American stock exchanges).
27. The original piece of legislation (Senate Bill 2731) was often characterized as the "Incum-
bent Management Protection Act." See Moylan, Exploring the Tender Offer Provisions of the
Federal Securities Laws, 43 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 551, 553 (1975).
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management and those engaging in takeover practices.2 8 In accor-
dance with the recommendations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the Williams Act, as revised, imposed restrictions
on the behavior of target management, particularly those opposing
the tender offer, and reduced restrictions on the conduct of the ac-
quiring business entity.29
As enacted in 1968, the Willaims Act was designed to serve two
interrelated objectives: protection of investors through the disclosure
of information and preservation of the tender offer process through
neutral regulations. 30 The Williams Act included provisions designed
to promote a balance of power between the acquiring business and the
affiliates of the target company. This balance of power was to be ac-
complished by ensuring that ample information was provided and ade-
quate time given for shareholders to consider the offer.31
This article will focus on tender offers and the provisions contained
within § 14(d) of the Exchange Act, 32 which provide in pertinent part:
Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders before the expiration there of by increasing
the consideration offered to holders of such securities, such person
shall pay the increased consideration to each security holder whose
securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders whether or not such securities have
been taken up by such person before the variation of the tender
offer or request or invitation.33
Commonly referred to as the AHBPR, it requires a company that is
making a tender offer to pay all tendering shareholders the same price
for their shares. 34
In its adoption of the AHBPR, the SEC included two additional
substantive requirements intended to prevent acquiring businesses
28. "We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales in favor of management or in
favor of the person making the takeover bids." Id. at 252. Senator Williams went on further to
state, "S.510 is designed solely to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors. The
bill will at the same time provide the offeror and management equal opportunity to present their
case." JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 919, n.18 (2000).
29. Id. at 251. The SEC submitted several comments to Senator Williams, as well as a revised
version of the bill, id. at 250, n.50.
30. Id. at 252.
31. Id. at 244. The major provisions regulating tender offers are Section 14(d) regulating
third-party tender offers, section 14(e) is the general antifraud/antimanipulation provision for all
tender offers, and 13(e) governs a company's purchase of its own securities, including by way of
tender offer, id. at 254.
32. As amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10.
33. The AHBPR, as codified by 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(7) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10.
34. Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Ltd., 133 F. Supp.2d 632, 634 (M.D.Tenn. 2000).
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from discriminating among target shareholders. 35 The first addition
holds that a tender offer must be open to all target shareholders own-
ing the particular class, or classes, of securities that the acquiring com-
pany is seeking. 36 The SEC's second addition requires that all target
shareholders must be paid the highest consideration paid to any other
shareholder during the tender offer.37
The major policy that motivated passage of the Exchange Act, in
particular the AHBPR, and its eventual adoption by the SEC, was the
notion of fair and equal treatment among all target shareholders. This
is evident in the various provisions throughout the Exchange Act that
serve to provide target shareholders with adequate time to consider
the communications from both the tender offeror and target manage-
ment in deciding whether to tender, sell into the market, or retain all
or part of their securities. 38
B. Field v. Trump & The Functional Tender Offer Test
Following the SEC's adoption of the AHBPR in 1986, Field v.
Trump,39 litigated in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, presented
one of the first tests for the application of the rules pertaining to
tender offers.40 The court in Field held that the payment of additional
consideration to certain shareholders, in an effort to gain their ap-
proval of a tender offer, violated the AHBPR because it resulted in
the payment of different prices to target shareholders for the tender-
ing of their common shares of stock.41
35. Tyson, supra note 3, at 259. The additional requirements are contained in rule 14d-10,
codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10.
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(1) (1990). The all-holders requirement does not prevent a
tender offeror from excluding all shareholders in a state where the offeror is prohibited from
making the tender offer by government regulation pursuant to state statute, provided the offeror
has made a good faith effort to comply with the statute. Id. § 240.14d-10(b)(2).
37. Id. § 240.14d-10(a)(2). The best-price provision does not prohibit more than one type of
consideration as long as shareholders are permitted to elect among each type and the highest
consideration of each type paid to any shareholder is paid to any other shareholder receiving
that type of consideration. Id. § 240.14d-10(c). The best-price provision's design prevents a
tender offeror from paying a higher consideration to employee-shareholders than to non-em-
ployee-shareholders. Tyson, supra note 3, at 260 n.88.
38. Tyson, supra note 3, at 260.
39. Field, 850 F.2d 938.
40. Second Circuit Appellate Judge Winter said it clearly, "The legal issue in this appeal con-
cerns the meaning of the so-called 'best-price rule' of Section 14(d)(7) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, and the disclosure obligations of a publicly held company under that Act."
Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 940 (1988).
41. Id. at 945.
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The dispute began in January 1984 when defendant Pay'n Save Cor-
poration acquired Schuck's Auto Supply, Inc.42 The transaction left
the defendants, Samuel N. Stroum, Stuart M. Sloan, and members of
their families (collectively the "Stroum Group"), with possession of a
substantial portion of Pay'n Save's outstanding common stock.4 3 The
Stroum Group was strongly opposed to the management of Pay'n
Save at the time. As a result, Pay'n Save's management obtained a
standstill agreement on March 30, 1984, in which the Stroum Group
agreed not to sell or otherwise dispose of their shares, or to offer to
purchase Pay'n Save.44 However, relations between Pay'n Save's
management and the Stroum Group did not improve.
At that time defendant Calvin Hendricks, Pay'n Save's Chief Finan-
cial Officer and Vice-Chairman of its board, initiated discussions to
acquire Pay'n Save with defendant Eddie Trump, President of the
Trump Group, Ltd., an acquisition company (the "Trumps"). 4 5 After
reaching an agreement on August 31, 1984, the Trumps proposed to
Pay'n Save's board a cash tender offer at $22.00 per share for two-
thirds of the company's shares, with a cash-out merger at the same
price to follow. 46 Approximately one week later, at a late-night Pay'n
Save board meeting, the Trumps raised the tender offer to $22.50 per
share, but warned that the offer would be withdrawn if it were not
approved.4 7 Although a majority of the board approved the offer,
board members Samuel Stroum and Stuart Sloan did not. 48
Over the course of the next few days, the Trumps engaged in vari-
ous efforts to obtain the approval of Stroum and Sloan. Following a
meeting on September 12, 1984, the Trumps announced to the Pay'n
Save board that they were withdrawing their tender offer in order to
engage in further negotiations with the Stroum Group.49 On that
42. Field, 850 F.2d at 941.
43. The Stroum Group possessed 18.4% of Pay'n Save's outstanding common stock. Id.
44. In return for their involvement, Samuel Stroum and Stuart Sloan received seats on the
Pay'n Save's board Id.
45. Id.
46. The cash-out merger would allow the Trumps to purchase whatever outstanding shares of
common stock had not been acquired in the initial tender offer; the holders of Pay'n Save com-
mon stock would be required to tender their shares as a result of the cash-out merger, if they had
not already done so. The Trumps also required that Pay'n Save management agree to participate
in the equity of the resulting entity, before it would consider an acquisition of the company. Id.
47. The Stroum Group refused to approve the offer despite that fact that Merrill Lynch, who
had been retained by Pay'n Save management, opined that the $22.50 offer was a fair price.
Field, 850 F.2d at 941.
48. In a statement released the next morning, September 7, 1984, the Stroum Group referred
to the Trump offer as "skimpy" and accused management of acting in "unseemly haste". Id.
49. The Trumps issued a press release that announced both the withdrawal of their tender
offer and the ongoing negotiations with the Stroum Group. Id.
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same night, the parties reached an agreement under which the Trumps
would pay the Stroum Group $3,300,000 for an option to purchase
their shares of Pay'n Save stock at $23.50 per share. 50 The agreement
also included the payment of $900,000 to the Stroum Group for "fees
and expenses." 5' The Pay'n Save board approved the agreement be-
tween the Trumps and the Stroum Group as an amendment to the
new tender offer, which provided a tender price of $23.50 per share
for common stock.52
In response to the higher price received by the Stroum Group for
their shares, Bertram Field, a Pay'n Save shareholder, brought an ac-
tion against the Trumps, their firms, Pay'n Save and its officers and
directors.53 Count I alleged that the $4,200,000 payment to the
Stroum Group constituted additional consideration of $1.50 per share
above what the other shareholders received, in violation of the
AHBPR.54
The parties disputed whether the $4,200,000 payment was made
during the tender offer, a determination upon which the entire case
rested.55 The District Court dismissed Count I of the complaint and
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with their
interpretation. 56
The court noted that since the Exchange Act did not define "tender
offer," application of a functional test was appropriate for its analysis;
a test that would scrutinize such agreements in the context of various
salient characteristics of tender offers and would also take into consid-
eration the Exchange Act's stated legislative purpose.57 The court re-
jected the parties' use of labels that one tender offer was 'withdrawn'
and a 'new' offer made. 58 In its analysis of Rule 14d-2(b), the court
50. Id. at 941-942.
51. The total payment of $4,200,000 to the Stroum Group, when added to the $23.50 paid per
share made it so that the members of the Stroum Group were receiving $25.00 per share. Id. at
942.
52. Field, 850 F.2d at 942.
53. The suit was brought as a putative class action against Pay'n Save, its officers, its pro-
management directors, the Stroum Group, and the Trumps and their affiliated entities. Id.
54. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the $1.50 premium was intended to induce the Stroum
Group's acceptance of the tender offer. Id. at 943.
55. Field, 850 F.2d at 943.
56. The District Court summarized their opinion by citing Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp.,
"Neither the [Williams] Act nor any SEC rule promulgated thereunder prohibits a former tender
offeror from purchasing stock of a target through privately negotiated transactions immediately
after a tender offer has been terminated." 774 F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1985). The District Court also
reasoned that no tender offer was in place at the time of the Settlement Agreement, so as a
matter of law, there was no violation of the AHBPR. 661 F.Supp. 529, at 532.
57. Field, 850 F.2d at 943-944.
58. Id. at 944.
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ruled that "purchases of shares by an offeror after a purported with-
drawal of a tender offer may constitute a continuation of the original
tender offer." 59 It ruled that for purposes of the AHBPR, withdrawal
of a tender offer is only effective when the offeror genuinely intends
to abandon the goal of the original offer.60 In its application of the
Functional Test,61 the court used a series of factors to determine that
the Trumps had not abandoned the goal of the original offer.
62 It
treated the two tender offers as a single continuing offer for the pur-
poses of the AHBPR, thus the agreement with the Stroum Group was
deemed a violation of the AHBPR. 63
C. Epstein v. MCA & The Integral Part Test
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' 1995 decision in Epstein v.
MCA64 marked the adoption of a new test for analysis under the
AHBPR.65 Epstein involved a collection of actions from shareholders
of a target corporation, both individually and on behalf of all target
shareholders, against allegedly favored target corporation sharehold-
ers and the acquiring corporation. 66 The Epstein court held that the
payment of additional consideration to a shareholder because of his
status as an officer-shareholder violated the AHBPR.67
The dispute began when Matsushita Electrical Co. Ltd. ("Matsu-
shita") acquired MCA, Inc. (MCA) for $6.1 billion in 1990.68 Matsu-
shita made the acquisition through a tender offer of $71 per share for
MCA common stock.69 The tender offer price consisted of $66 in cash
and $5 worth of stock in a subsidiary company of MCA.70
59. Id. The court held that the language § 14(d)(7) explicitly recognizes material changes to
the terms of a tender offer, such as an increase in price, as a continuation of the original offer
rather than a new tender offer. Id.
60. Field, 850 F.2d at 945.
61. See Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (citing the decision in Field and noting the basic character-
istics of the Functional Test).
62. The factors included: (1) are the offers part of a single plan of acquisition; (2) do the
offers involve the purchase of the same class of security; and (3) are the offers made at or about
the same time. Field, 850 F.2d at 945.
63. Id.
64. Epstein v. MCA, 50 F.3d 644 (C.D.Cal. 1995).
65. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(7), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(n)(d)(7); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-10.
66. Epstein, 50 F.3d at 648, n.4.
67. The court noted that the agreement had specifically violated § 14d-10(c)(1) of the Ex-
change Act. Id. at 657.
68. Id. at 647.
69. Epstein, 50 F.3d at 647.
70. The tender offer included $66.00 in cash and $5.00 worth of stock in WWOR-TV, a televi-
sion station spun-off from MCA, because there were legal restrictions against foreign ownership
of domestic broadcast stations. ld at 647 n.1.
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Shareholders of MCA common stock argued that two individuals,
Lew Wasserman, MCA's chairman and chief executive officer, and
Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's chief operating officer, had received addi-
tional payments in return for the tender of their shares.7a Wasserman
owned 4,953,927 shares of MCA common stock, worth $351,728,817 at
the tender offer price of $71.00 per share.72 Wasserman did not
tender his shares, but rather, entered into a separate agreement with
Matsushita (the "Wasserman Transaction") in which Wasserman ex-
changed his shares of MCA common stock for preferred stock in a
wholly owned Matsushita subsidiary called MEA Holdings
("MEA"). 73 The thrust of the agreement was that Matsushita would
fund MEA by contributing 106% of the tender price, multiplied by
the number of MCA shares Wasserman exchanged. 74 Sheinberg's
agreement differed in the respect that he received additional consider-
ation of $83,754,085 above the tender offer price of $71 per share and
also received $21 million in cash two days after Matsushita had ac-
cepted all tendered shares. 75
A class of former MCA shareholders, who had tendered their
shares at $71 (the "Plaintiffs"), argued that Matsushita's treatment of
Wasserman and Sheinberg violated the AHBPR.76 The District Court
granted summary judgment on this claim to Matsushita.77 However,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, with instruc-
tions to grant the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 78
In its analysis of the Wasserman Transaction, the court focused on
whether the transaction was an integral part of the acquiring com-
pany's tender offer. If it was, the offeror violated the AHBPR be-
cause it paid to him, pursuant to the tender offer, different
consideration than it had offered to the other shareholders. 79 The
court noted four areas in which the Wasserman Transaction appeared
71. Id. at 647-648.
72. Id. at 647.
73. The Wasserman agreement was known as the 'Capital Contribution and Loan Agree-
ment.' Epstein, 50 F.3d at 647-648.
74. In addition the preferred stock that Wasserman received paid a dividend of 8.75% annu-
ally, was secured by letters of credit, and was redeemable upon the death of either Wasserman or
his wife. Id. at 648.
75. The $21 million was allegedly exchanged for unexercised stock options. Id.
76. Epstein, 50 F.3d at 648.
77. Id.
78. With respect to the $21 million paid to Sheinberg, the Court vacated the ruling and re-
manded for further proceedings to determine if it was in fact a premium paid to encourage
Sheinberg to tender his shares. Id.
79. Epstein, 50 F.3d at 655-656. The preferred stock that Wasserman received may have had a
value greater than $326,959,182, the value of his 4,953,927 shares at the cash tender price of $66
per share. Id. at 657.
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to be conditioned on the success of the tender offer: (1) neither party
was obligated to perform if the conditions of the tender offer were not
satisfied; (2) timing of performance was tied to the tender offer's com-
pletion; (3) the amount of cash Matsushita was required to contribute
to MEA was dependent upon the tender offer price; and (4) the re-
demption value of Wasserman's preferred stock was set as the tender
price.80 From these facts the court concluded that the Wasserman
Transaction was an integral part of the tender offer, thus subject to the
requirements of the AHBPR.81 The court based its Integral Part Test
on the fact that the redemption value of Wasserman's preferred stock
incorporated the tender offer price by reference and the Wasserman
Transaction was conditioned solely on the success of the tender of-
fer.82 Accordingly, the court held that Matsushita's payment of addi-
tional consideration to Wasserman violated the AHBPR because they
had failed to offer equal consideration to the other shareholders. 83
D. Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co. & The Bright Line Test
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' 1996 decision in Lerro v.
Quaker Oats Co.,84 signified one of the strictest interpretations of the
AHBPR. The court used a Bright Line Test to hold that a distribution
agreement made between Quaker Oats and Selective Beverages Inc.
did not violate the AHBPR.85
The case arose when Quaker Oats acquired Snapple Beverage
Corp. in 1994 for $1.7 billion.8 6 On November 1, 1994, a merger
agreement was signed between the two companies and a tender offer
to the public was announced on November 4.87 In both the tender
offer and merger agreement Quaker Oats offered to pay $14 in cash
for each share of Snapple stock. 88 Despite the ability of shareholders
80. If Matsushita increased the tender price at any point it would have been required to in-
crease both the funding of MEA and the amount paid upon the redemption of Wasserman's
preferred stock. Id. at 653.
81. Epstein, 50 F.3d at 656.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 657. The court rejected Matsushita's argument that the plaintiffs were unable to
prove that they suffered injury as a result of the Wasserman Transaction. Id.
84. 84 F.3d 239 (N.D.Ill. 1996).
85. The court based its decision on the timing of the tender offer and payments, "so far as the
Williams Act and Rule 14d-10(a)(2) are concerned, Quaker Oats could have bought Lee's shares
at $20 (or $50) apiece the day before commencing the tender offer, without objection from other
investors." Id. at 242-243.
86. Lerro, 84 F3d at 240.
87. Id.
88. Included in the agreements was the provision that investors, who viewed $14 per share as
inadequate, could refuse to tender, vote against the merger, and demand appraisal under § 262
of the Delaware Corporation Law. Lerro, 84 F.3d at 240.
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to oppose the agreements, the transaction was assured through the
support of defendant Thomas H. Lee, who controlled approximately
40% of Snapple's shares.89 When the offer was eventually closed,
96.5% of Snapple's stock had been tendered and Snapple Beverage
Corporation became a wholly owned subsidiary of Quaker Oats.90
The dispute surrounded a distribution agreement ("Distributor
Agreement") that was made between Quaker Oats and Select Bever-
ages Inc. Joseph Lerro and John Duty, two investors in the transac-
tion (the "Plaintiffs") claimed that the anticipated profits under the
Distributor Agreement constituted additional consideration to Mr.
Lee that should be paid to all shareholders pursuant to the AHBPR. 9'
The Distributor Agreement granted exclusive distribution rights for a
certain geographic area to Select Beverages Inc., a company in which
Lee and his affiliates held a majority of the common stock.92 Of par-
ticular contention was a statement in the tender offer documents, "the
[Distribution] Agreement commences upon consummation of the Of-
fer."' 93 Rather than addressing many of the contentious issues, the
District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim 94 and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.95
The Appellate Court chose to apply the Bright Line Test in its anal-
ysis of the Distributor Agreement's role within the tender offer. The
court held that the language of the securities statutes and regulations
was controlling, "[b]efore the offer is not 'during' the offer. '96 In par-
ticular, the court held that the very purpose of SEC Rules 10b-13 and
14d-10 was to mark the periods during which the restrictions of the
Williams Act should apply. 97 The court supported this contention
with a policy-based argument in favor of free market transactions near
89. Shareholders who regarded $14 per share as too low could refuse to tender, vote against
the merger, and demand appraisal under § 262 of the Delaware Corporation Law. Id. The exact
percentage owned by Mr. Lee is uncertain; the plaintiff's claim "at least 35 percent", while the
tender offer documents place the figure at 47 percent. Id.
90. Quaker Oats effected a short-form merger, under Delaware law, between Snapple and
LOOP Acquisition Corporation, which had been created solely for this purpose. LOOP later
changed its name to Snapple Beverage Corporation. Id.
91. Id. at 240-241.
92. The 'area' included parts of Indiana, Illinois (including Chicago), and Wisconsin. Id. at
240.
93. Lerro, 84 F.3d at 240.
94. The court cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 241.
95. Id. at 246.
96. The court went on to state that, "The difference between 'during' and 'before' (or 'after')
is not just linguistic." Id. at 243.
97. Lerro, 84 F.3d at 243.
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the time of a tender offer, as well as immediately before and after.98
In applying the Bright Line Test, the court stated that the Distributor
Agreement was signed on November 1, 1994, while the tender offer
did not commence until November 4, thus placing the Distributor
Agreement outside the reach of the AHBPR.99
E. Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Ltd. & The Combined Test
The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee's ruling in
Katt v. Titan Acquisitions Ltd.,100 decided in the fall of 2000, has re-
sulted in a great level of uncertainty for litigation under the AHBPR.
Similar to Epstein,10 1 Katt arose from a target shareholder suit, Inter-
national Comfort Products ("ICP"), against the acquiring companies,
Titan Acquisitions, Ltd. ("Titan") and United Technologies Corpora-
tion ("UTC"), as well as various other individuals. 10 2 The court in
Katt held that a series of executive compensation agreements pro-
vided to officers of the target company violated the AHBPR because
a jury could likely rule that Titan induced the agreements as a part of
its tender offer for ICP and not as contracts solely between ICP and
its officers. 10 3
Titan made a tender offer for all outstanding shares of ICP for
$11.75 per share with the provision that Titan, upon consummation of
the offer, would honor various agreements that it had made with ICP
and several of its officers, who were also shareholders. 10 4 In one of
the agreements certain ICP officers were given accelerated awards
under the company's preexisting 'Annual and Long Term Incentive
Plan'. 0 5 Another, the "performance unit award agreement," based
payments to ICP officers and others on the number of years that the
98. The court opined that treating the Distributor Agreement as a premium for each of Lee's
shares was the same as a higher cash price in advance. Id.
99. Id. at 245.
100. Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Ltd., 133 F.Supp.2d 632 (M.D.Tenn. 2000).
101. Epstein, 50 F.3d 644.
102. The suit was filed by Lowell Katt, an investor, as a class on behalf of himself and similarly
situated investors against Titan, UTC, William Trachsel, a UTC corporate officer, and Ari Bous-
bib, Titan's president. Id. at 634.
103. Id. at 645-646. The court recognized the common role of executive compensation agree-
ments, but distinguished the agreements between Titan and ICP, "[A]s a general rule, incentive
contracts between a company and its key officers and executives are not subject to Section
14(d)(7) [AHBPR], but these agreements with ICP officers were executed solely in the context
of the Titan's tender offer agreement between Titan and ICP." Id. at 645.
104. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
105. Referred to as the "accelerated incentive award agreement," this agreement became ef-
fective on January 1, 1999. The Plan, however, was brought up for shareholder vote at the com-
pany's annual meeting on May 19, 1999. Id. at 636.
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individual had been in the company's "performance cycle. ' 10 6 In ad-
dition to these payments, UTC offered "sign on" bonuses of $100,000
to three ICP officers and also provided the officers with the ability to
convert certain severance benefits and stock awards if the officers ac-
cepted employment with UTC following the takeover. 10 7 Titan also
offered to pay certain ICP officers a Retention Bonus that was contin-
gent on their continued employment with ICP.108
Lowell Katt, a stockholder in ICP, filed a class action suit on his
own behalf and those similarly situated investors (the "Plaintiffs"), ar-
guing that the side agreements were part of the tender offer because
they induced ICP officers to tender their shares and to recommend
that all shareholders tender. The Plaintiffs argued that such induce-
ments violated the AHBPR.10 9 In its analysis, the court acknowl-
edged the split among the circuits as to which was the appropriate test
to apply.110 The court noted the Seventh Circuit's use of the Bright
Line Test in Lerro,"' the Ninth Circuit's use of the Integral Part Test
in Epstein,112 and the Second Circuit's use of the Functional Test in
Field."3 The Katt court chose to adopt a test that blended aspects of
both the Integral Part and Functional Tests (the "Combined Test"). 114
Although the court declined to adopt any part of the Bright Line Test,
it acknowledged the merit of that test." 5
Through its adoption of the Combined Test, the court opined that
the controlling issue was whether these types of financial incentive
106. The Plaintiffs contend that the award was as much as $2.5 million for each year in the
cycle. Kati, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
107. Id. at 636.
108. Titan promised to pay the retention bonuses within 60 to 90 days after the consummation
of the tender offer. Id.
109. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
110. Id. at 640.
111. See supra note 56. See also Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360
(N.D. Ga. 2001) (finding the defendant's reliance on Lerro as persuasive in its decision to grant
the defendant's motion to dismiss).
112. Epstein, 50 F.3d 644. See also McMichael v. United States Filter Corp., 2001 WL 418981
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2001) (denying plaintiff's claim that payments were integral to the tender
offer); Karlin v. Alcatel, 2001 WL 1301216 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2001) (finding the facts of the case
to be virtually identical to those presented in Epstein, particularly those facts associated with the
Sheinberg transaction).
113. Field, 850 F.2d 938. The Katt court recognized the variance of the decisions within the
Circuits, yet chose to adopt a test that did not follow any of the prior rulings. Katt, 133
F.Supp.2d at 640.
114. The Court held that both tests served the purpose behind both the congressional adop-
tion of Section 14(d) and the SEC's drafting of Rule 14d-10. Id. at 644.
115. This decision was interesting because the Katt court acknowledged the ability of the
'bright line' test to provide certainty in the marketplace, but chose not to rely on the issue of
timing in reaching its own decision. Id.
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agreements with any shareholder of the acquired company are inte-
grally tied to the successful completion of the tender offer. 116 The
court concluded that the incentive agreements between the acquiring
companies and the ICP officers were an integral part of Titan's tender
offer and constituted additional consideration that was offered to se-
lect shareholders, while denied from other shareholders, in violation
of the AHBPR.1 17 The court articulated that, as a general rule, incen-
tive contracts between a company and its key officers will not be sub-
ject to the AHBPR, but the agreements in Katt were executed solely
in the context of Titan's tender offer.' 8 The court relied on the fact
that a jury could find that Titan induced the agreements as a part of
their tender offer, so they were subject to the AHBPR. 19 Accord-
ingly, the Katt court denied Titan's motion to dismiss.' 2 0
III. ANALYSIS
The variance in decisions among the circuits has led to a great level
of uncertainty for those wishing to engage in any form of business
transaction that may involve a tender offer. Executive compensation
arrangements have long been a part of virtually all business transac-
tions, however, there legality is under dispute because of the differing
views and tests that the courts have adopted. Part A goes through
each of the existing tests acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses
of each. Part A.1. addresses the faults of the AHBPR as drafted in
the Williams Act and as adopted by the SEC. Part A.2. points out the
vagueness of the Functional Test in its reliance on individual court
interpretation for application. Part A.3. denounces the Integral Part
Test as being little more than a judicial title for what is essentially a
case-by-case approach. Part A.4. addresses the strengths of the Bright
Line Test-the certainty that it provides for those wishing to engage in
a tender offer. Part A.5. criticizes the Katt12' court's decision to adopt
a Combined Test that includes aspects of both the Functional Test and
Integral Part Tests. Part B lays out some of the possible solutions for
consistent application of the AHBPR. Part B.1. suggest a series of
alternatives for structuring a business deal, so as to eliminate the risk
of violating the AHBPR. Part B.2. addresses the business commu-
116. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 644. The term, 'combined test', has been created for use within
this article to refer to the test adopted by the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee in Katt.
117. Id.
118. Katt, 133 F.Supp.2d at 645.
119. Id. at 646.
120. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 640-641.
121. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 632.
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nity's hope that the courts, SEC, or Congress will, in the foreseeable
future, provide long term solutions for the practice of tender offers.
The court's decision in Katt created a significant level of uncertainty
for companies wishing to engage in tender offers, but much of the
confusion already existed. The various circuits have adopted their
own tests that, depending on the one chosen, can result in decisions
that are completely at odds with one another. 122 The current problem
is that companies engaging in tender offers have no guidelines to de-
termine what behavior is admissible and what behavior is not. It de-
pends solely on the Circuit in which the suit is filed as to what test
might be applied. Each of the tests that the courts have adopted is
flawed in some respect, whether it is too narrow or too broad in its
application. 123
The solution rests in the hands of Congress, SEC, and the Supreme
Court. None of the circuits addressing the issue is going to ignore its
own precedent and adopt another test. The only remedy that can pro-
vide the appropriate guidance needed in today's marketplace is that of
a universal test. The appropriate test is one that adopts a narrow
time-based interpretation of the rules to eliminate any chance for dis-
crepancies. Rather than examining the details of the payments made
in each case, it would be wiser to establish a clear regulatory time
frame in which additional consideration to tendering shareholders, re-
gardless of its form, is strictly prohibited. 124 In order to succeed in
today's international business community, companies must be able to
merge and engage in acquisition transactions freely and without fear
of statutory violation.
A. Critique of Existing Tests
The following sections address each of the tests that the courts have
adopted, acknowledging both their strengths and weaknesses. Part
III.A.1. examines the AHBPR, as drafted in the Williams Act and
adopted by the SEC. Part III.A.2. addresses the Functional Test, as
relied upon in Field.125 Part III.A.3. examines the Integral Part Test,
122. Compare Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 943-944 (1988) (citing the "salient characteristics
of tender offers" to determine that the defendants had not violated the AHBPR), with Katt v.
Titan Acquisitions Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 645 (2000) (ruling that agreements had violated the
AHBPR because they were "executed solely in the context" of the tender offer).
123. See Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 943-944. The court fails to ever fully define the "salient
characteristics of a tender offer," but uses the term as the basis for its decision to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint. Id.
124. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 246 (defining the tender offer strictly on the
date of commencement of the offer).
125. Field, 850 F.2d at 943-945.
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as applied in Epstein.126 Part III.A.4. addresses the Bright Line Test,
as followed in Lerro.127 Part III.A.5. examines the Combined Test, as
formulated in Katt.128
1. The Willams Act & SEC Adoption
Congress enacted the Williams Act in 1968 to protect tendering
shareholders from discrimination, but it failed to adequately outline
the rules that had to be followed. The SEC tried to create a more
expansive rule when it adopted the provision in 1986,129 and then cre-
ated the AHBPR.a30 Unfortunately, this rule also failed to provide
the guidelines necessary for the regulation of tender offers because it
lacked specificity with respect to what particular actions were prohib-
ited. The ever-changing face of modern business has created countless
forms of tender offers that cannot be effectively regulated under the
current rules.
2. The Functional Test
The Functional Test, as the Second Circuit used in Field,13' is logical
in appearance, but is too vague in its application. The primary weak-
ness with the test is that it relies on the court's interpretation of what
it regards as "salient characteristics of tender offers."'1 32 The test is
also flawed in its reliance on legislative purpose;133 a concept that is
often unclear, even after extensive study of the legislative record. Al-
though the test lays out a series of factors that are clear and can be
easily answered, there is one factor that is fatally inconclusive. 34 The
factor asks whether the various offers were part of a single plan of
acquisition. The problem with this factor is that the court neglected to
accurately define 'plan of acquisition'.1 35 One might regard any offers
126. Epstein, 50 F.3d at 655-657.
127. Lerro, 84 F.3d at 245-246.
128. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 644-646.
129. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
130. 17 CFR § 240.14d-10. The Rule provides that no bidder may make a tender offer unless
the offer is open to all security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer, and
that the consideration paid to any security holder pursuant to the tender offer is the highest
consideration made to any other security holder during such tender offer. 100 A.L.R. Fed. 444
(1990).
131. Field, 850 F.2d 938.
132. See infra note 31.
133. Field, 850 F.2d at 946 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)).
134. Field, 850 F.2d at 945. The court cites the SEC's identification of relevant factors for
analyzing tender offers and also raising additional factors for defining the extent of "integra-
tion." Id.
135. The court does note that were the goal has not been abandoned a new offer must be
treated as a single continuing offer. Field, 850 F.2d at 945.
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relating to the same acquiring and target companies as being a single
plan of acquisition, while another person may rely on the specific
numbers and terms in defining what constitutes a plan of acquisition.
The Functional Test represents a strong effort at solving the tender
offer puzzle, but still an inadequate one. The factors included in the
test fail to provide the clear guidelines necessary for today's compa-
nies.136 As long as a court's test allows for different interpretations of
its meaning, companies will be uncertain in their transactions and
shareholders will be more likely to file suit. The Functional Test cre-
ates judgments that depend solely on which side makes the better ar-
gument and uses the right language.
3. The Integral Part Test
Similar to the Functional Test, the Integral Part Test lacks the speci-
ficity needed for effective control of tender offers. As the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied it in Epstein,1 37 the Integral Part Test asked only if the
financial arrangements at issue were entered into "in furtherance of
the tender offer. 1 38 The Integral Part Test does have an advantage in
that it compels the court to examine the nature of the arrangements in
question. The test requires the court to form a better understanding
of the tender offer and the reasons for its adoption.139 However, the
test is completely void of structure and, thus, fails to establish any
discernible guidelines for future tender offers. The Integral Part Test
is essentially a fancy name for a 'case-by-case' approach. Rather than
providing answers, the Integral Part Test merely provides the hope
that the court will look favorably at the case. 140 In all of the cases
136. "Analogous factors may thus point to 'integration' in the context of formally separate
tender offers: (1) are the offers part of the single plan of acquisition; (2) do the offers involve
the purchase of the same class of security; and (3) are the offers made at or about the same
time?" Field, 850 F.2d at 945.
137. Epstein, 50 F.3d 644.
138. Stephen I. Glover, Applying the Best Price Rule to Employee Retention Bonuses, 4 No. 11
M & A Law. 19 (April 2001). The integral part test is generally regarded as the opposite of the
bright line test because the Bright Line Test is narrow in application and requires that certain
decisions be reached, solely on the basis of the tender offer's commencement and the payment
of additional consideration. Id. at 19.
139. The Epstein court held the Wasserman Transaction to integral part of the tender offer
because it was, in several material respects, conditioned on the terms of the offer. The court
reached this conclusion by examining the details of both the tender offer and the Wasserman
Transaction. In particular, the court noted two facts about the Wasserman Transaction, "first,
the redemption value of Wasserman's preferred stock incorporated the tender offer price by
reference, and second, the Capital Contribution and Loan Agreement was conditioned on the
tender offer's success." Epstein, 50 F.3d at 656.
140. "The problem with a [integral part] test is that, while the case establishing such a test my
scream for a [integral part] analysis (as is true with Epstein), invariably a borderline case sneaks
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examined throughout this article, one could easily argue that the ar-
rangements in question were adopted in furtherance of the tender of-
fer. If it were clear that the arrangements were independent of the
tender offer, there would not even be any litigation of the matter.
4. The Bright Line Test
The Seventh Circuit, in its decision in Lerro,'41 adopted the most
logical and simplest approach for determining whether an acquiring
company's actions violated any tender offer regulation. In Lerro, the
court chose to apply a Bright Line Test that was dependent upon the
timing of payment of extra consideration. 42 The Bright Line Test
held that any consideration paid after the commencement of a tender
offer and before its closure would be regarded as "pursuant to the
tender offer."'1 43 An important aspect of the Bright Line Test is that it
has its foundation in the statutory language. Rule 14d-2144 establishes
that a tender offer begins at 12:01 a.m. on the earliest date of one of
the following events: (1) the first publication of the long form tender
offer filed; 145 (2) the first publication of a summary advertisement; 146
or (3) the first public announcement of the tender offer, 147 unless
within five days of the announcement the "bidder"'148 makes a public
statement withdrawing the tender offer or complies with the appropri-
ate disclosure and filing requirements, which all require public presen-
tation of relevant information. 149
On a conceptual level, the importance of the Seventh Circuit's use
of a Bright Line Test is that it acknowledged the need for stability in
tender offer transactions. The court recognized that the approach was
through, creating uncertainty for practitioners and companies trying to structure transactions."
Lawson, supra note 1, at 49,
141. Lerro, 84 F.3d 239.
142. "[T]he point of Rules lOb-13, 14d-10, and their cousins is to demark clearly the periods
during which the special Williams Act rules apply ... some line is essential, and it had best be a
bright one." Id. at 243.
143. The court used this term in accordance with its meaning under Rule 14d-10. Id.
144. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2.
145. Pursuant to Rule 14d-4(a)(1).
146. Rule 14d-4(a)(2) allows summary publications for certain types of tender offers. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-4(a)(2). See USG Corp v. Wagner & Brown, 689 F.Supp. 1483 (N.D.III. 1988)
(holding that a preliminary announcement complied with Rule 14d-2(d)'s safe harbor
requirement).
147. See Kahn v. Virginia Retirement System, 13 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 1993) (joint press release
that announced plans for takeover agreement did not commence the tender offer).
148. "The term 'bidder' means any person who makes a tender offer or on whose behalf a
tender offer is made [except for a tender offer by the issuer]." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(b)(1).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a) (filing and transmittal of tender offer statements). 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-6 (disclosure requirements with respect to tender offers). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (dis-
semination of tender offers).
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rather mechanical, but held that the critical need for certainty in the
regulation of tender offers justified its use. 150 While the Functional
Test and Integral Part Test focus on the content of the financial ar-
rangements in question,151 the Bright Line Test relies solely on the
timing of the arrangements.15 2 As a result, the Lerro court was able to
reach a decision much quicker and with a higher level of confi-
dence. 153 The effect of the Bright Line Test is that it eliminates much
of the guesswork and uncertainty associated with all of the other tests.
The definition of what constitutes a tender offer is not clearly laid out
in either the Williams Act or SEC regulations, 154 so the courts are
forced to analyze individual financial arrangements on a case-by-case
basis. It is this lack of clarity that has produced conflicting decisions
between the circuits' 55 and left potential tender offerors fearful of liti-
gation. 5 6 While companies operating in the regions under Second
and Ninth Circuit control can only guess whether their actions will be
ruled as violations of the AHBPR,157 those in the Seventh Circuit
need only pay attention to the timing of their decisions.
5. The Combined Test
The Combined Test used in Katt'5 8 is insufficient because it is essen-
tially a combination of the Ninth Circuit's Functional Test and the
Second Circuit's Integral Part Test. The threat of the Combined Test
is that it places any arrangement that becomes effective upon comple-
tion of the tender offer at risk, because the success of an acquisition
often rests primarily on whether target employees decide to remain
150. "Plaintiffs remind us that neither the Williams Act nor the SEC's regulations defines
'tender offer'. That term has been frustratingly difficult to encapsulate. True enough, but our
case is about 'when' rather than 'what'." Lerro, 84 F.3d at 246.
151. See supra notes 136, 139 and accompanying text.
152. The Lerro court adopted a narrow approach that held extra consideration to be 'pursu-
ant' to a tender offer only if it was paid after the tender offer's commencement. If a payment
was made either before a tender offer or after it had closed, it would not violate the Bright Line
Test adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Lerro. Glover, supra note 138, at 19.
153. Once the Lerro court found that the offer had commenced at 12:01 A.M. on November 4,
1994, it held that there were no other "facts to find or inferences to draw". Id.
154. Particularly those Rules that are known as the AHBPR, Sections 14(d)(7) and 14(d)(10)
of the Securities Exchange Act.
155. See infra Parts II.B-E.
156. "[A] recent federal case out of the middle district of Tennessee has the potential to scare
away many of those who would otherwise test these waters." Lawson, see supra note 1, at 49
(referring to the use of executive compensation arrangements in contemplation of corporate
transactions).
157. Sections 14(d)(7) and 14(d)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act.
158. 133 F. Supp. 2d 632.
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with the company or seek other options.159 The test's broad applica-
tion of the AHBPR serves to encourage litigation because it allows
potential plaintiffs to bring to court what are otherwise weak cases.160
There is little that can be done to discount a plaintiff's argument that
an arrangement was an integral part of a tender offer, other than rais-
ing counterarguments through litigation.
The Combined Test's most dramatic flaw is that it ignores the his-
torical nature of acquisition transactions. Since the inception of the
tender offer, companies have included employment retention bonuses
and other similar financial arrangements as part of their offer. 161 In
any tender offer there is a legitimate concern regarding employment
infrastructure.1 62 The effect of the Combined Test is that it tries to
control the acquiring company's ability to enter into retention agree-
ments.1 63 Bidders will be able to retain target employees who do not
own stock, but cannot retain those who do own stock because the re-
tention payments to employee-stockholders will automatically be
deemed as "pursuant" to the tender offer. 164 This runs counter to all
notions of effective business management because it forces companies
to reject those individuals who take a financial interest in their em-
ployer through stock ownership, while encouraging the retention of
those who do not. In addition, the Combined Test makes the outcome
of a case dependent upon whether the acquiring company structured
the transaction as a statutory merger or as a tender offer. 165
The Combined Test is not even a test, but is simply a judiciary loop-
hole for those companies who wish to avoid litigation in the event of a
tender offer. Rather than providing a company with answers as to
how it should structure a tender offer, the Combined Test merely
gives alternatives to the traditional tender offer.' 66 Some scholars
159. Glover, 4 No. 11 M & A Law. at 19. "Plaintiffs will almost always be able to argue that
these arrangements [compensation arrangements that benefit target employee-stockholders] are
an integral part of the tender offer." Id.
160. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
161. See Glover, 4 No. 11 M & A Law. 19. The author specifically regards such arrangements
as "essential part[s] of acquisition transactions." Id. See generally Lawson, 8/27/01 L.A. Bus. J.
49.
162. Glover, 4 No. 11 M & A Law. 19. It is often in the best interests of the acquiring com-
pany to retain as many of the target company's employees as possible. Id.
163. Id. at 19. The author regards this difference in treatment among target employees as "an
anomaly that is not easy to justify." Id.
164. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
165. Glover, 4 No. 11 M & A Law. 19. If the deal is structured as a statutory merger, the
AHBPR will not even apply. Id.
166. In light of the Katt decision, a bidder's freedom to enter into any form of retention agree-
ments depends solely on the structure of the deal. For example, a deal that is structured as a
statutory merger will not trigger the AHBPR. Id. See infra Part II.B.1.
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have even predicted that the Katt decision will ultimately be over-
turned as an "aberration," but to date this has not occurred. 67 It has
also been said that, as a direct result of Katt168 and the split between
the circuits, the Supreme Court or the SEC will be forced to address
the issue in the near future. 169
B. Possible Solutions
In light of the decision in Katt,170 it is important that potential
tender offerors be able to perform acquisitions. There are two sets of
options that must be examined. Part III.B.1. addresses a series of so-
lutions that avoid the risk of AHBPR violations and adhere to the
decision in Katt. Part III.B.2. proposes that the best solution, in order
to guarantee universal application throughout the country, would be
for the Supreme Court, SEC, or Congress to adopt a Bright Line Test.
1. Available Alternatives Under Current Law and Katt
Despite the unreasonableness of the court's decision in Katt, poten-
tial bidders must still be able to initiate tender offers if they chose to
do so. Companies cannot rest their decisions on speculation that the
Supreme Court will reach a favorable decision or that the SEC will
provide guidance because the potential risks for the loss of capital,
lengthy litigation, and the departure of highly valued target employees
are far too great.' 71 As a result, an interested company has three gen-
eral alternatives for structuring their business arrangements: 72
(1) The bidder should structure its deal so as to avoid implicat-
ing the rules that govern tender offers. The simplest method is
for the bidder and target companies to agree to a statutory
merger, rather than structuring it as a tender offer with a back-
167. "There is a good chance that Katt will ultimately be viewed as an aberration. Because
there is a split among the Circuit Courts, the Supreme Court may ultimately address the issue."
Glover, 4 No. 11 M & A Law. 19. See also Lawson, 8/27/01 L.A. Bus. J. 49 (recognizing the split
in the federal circuits and potential for Supreme Court clarification).
168. 133 F. Supp. 2d 632.
169. The hope that some higher authority will address the conflict among the circuits, and
particularly the confusion created by the Katt decision, was noted by article writer Stephen I.
Glover:
Because there is a split among the Circuit Courts, the Supreme Court may ultimately
address the issue. If it does, it might very well decide to adopt the bright line test, or at
least shorten the reach of the "integral part of the tender offer" and "functional" tests.
There is also some possibility that the SEC staff will weigh in with guidance on how the
rule should be applied.
4 No. 11 M & A Law. 19.
170. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 632.
171. See generally Glover, 4 No. 11 M & A Law. 19; Lawson, 8/27/01 L.A. Bus. J. 49.
172. Glover, 4 No. 11 M & A Law. 19.
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end merger. 173 If structured as a statutory merger, the AHBPR
does not apply and the bidder would be free to engage in special
financial arrangements with target employee-stockholders. 74
The main problem with this approach, particularly for companies
wishing to engage in quick-moving transactions, is that statutory
mergers require a significant amount of time. 175 The only excep-
tion is the rare case in which a small group of stockholders within
the target company owns a sufficient amount of a certain class of
stock to insure a potential bidder with control. 176 Under these
particular circumstances the bidder is able to legally acquire the
stock in a series of privately negotiated agreements that will not
trigger the rules governing tender offers.177
(2) The bidding company can structure its acquisition so that it
includes a tender offer, but does not provide for separate agree-
ments with target employees. The fault with this structure is that
it fails to reduce the risk of employee attrition.178 Unfortunately,
this is generally not the case with most acquisitions, particularly
when the target company is large in size. In order to ensure that
the merger goes smoothly, it is crucial that employees of the tar-
get company are treated appropriately and in most cases, ade-
quately compensated. 79
173. A back-end merger is the practice of cashing out those remaining shareholders who did
not tender their shares in response to the initial offer. The use of an initial tender offer followed
by a back-end merger can be seen as advantageous to the acquiring company:
In a two-tier, front-end loaded takeover bid, the bidder makes a first step cash tender
offer for approximately 50% of the target's shares and then 'squeezes out' the remain-
ing shareholders in a lower priced 'back-end' merger. Two-tier bids can be highly coer-
cive since the two-tier aspect of the bid stampedes shareholders into tendering (in the
first step) out of fear of receiving only the lower back-end consideration in the second
step merger.
Edward D. Herlihy, Mergers and Acquisitions: Developments in Takeover Techniques and De-
fense, 561 PLI/Corp 441, 468 (June 1, 1987) (emphasis added).
174. Id. The only restriction on any special financial arrangements would be that of existing
state law constraints on the practice.
175. The complexity of statutory mergers results from the fact that are controlled by the laws
of the respective states of incorporation for the companies involved, as well as the charter and
by-laws of each company. Alan C. Myers et al., Introduction to Mergers and Acquistions, 637
PLI/Corp 155, 168 (April 1, 1989).
176. Glover, 4 No. 11 M & A Law 19.
177. Id. The AHBPR would not apply to this transaction, so the bidder would be able to
engage in unique arrangements with respect to the individual shareholders. Id.
178. Glover, 4 No. 11 M & A Law. 19.
179. Edward D. Herlihy et al., Materials Submitted by Craig M. Wasserman, 1232 PLI/Corp
397, 432 (February 2001). A common practice of modern-day mergers is the inclusion of reten-
tion programs, particularly in those transactions where employees are regarded as a principal
asset. For example, those occasions where there may be cultural differences between the target
and acquiring companies. Id.
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(3) A bidding company can decide to structure a deal so that it
includes a tender offer and retention bonuses, or other financial
incentives, to target employee stockholders, but it must do so in a
manner that minimizes the risk that the payments will be viewed
as tender offer consideration. When confronted with a court that
is applying the Katt decision, a bidder's only option is to take into
account a series of factors that the court will use to assess the
financial arrangements that have been entered into:180
(a) Is there a real risk of employee attrition? If the companies
are able to prove that employee attrition is a true concern,
the court is more likely to regard any special financial ar-
rangements as justified. This is one of the easier factors to
prove because employee attrition is a legitimate concern in
virtually any acquisition.181
(b) Which party, bidder or target, initiates and leads the discus-
sions concerning retention bonuses? There is a direct corre-
lation between the bidder's level of involvement in the
discussion of special financial arrangements and the court's
finding that the payments are an integral part of the tender
offer. 182 As a result, it is in the bidder's best interest to re-
frain from initiating discussions of retention payments. The
bidder's safest alternative is to indirectly influence the tar-
get company by requiring that a condition to closing be the
retention of specific employees.
(c) Is the success of the deal contingent upon the tendering of
shares by the target employees? Contrary to the decision in
Katt,18 3 it is likely that a court would regard the number of
shares that employees hold as relevant to whether the pay-
ments are made in connection with the tender offer.184 It is
a strong advantage if the bidder can prove that it would have
180. 4 No. 11 GLMALAW 19. Both the target and bidder companies in designing the transac-
tion should consider the factors.
181. The significance of employees attrition in the acquisition context is recognized by virtu-
ally all companies that engage in the practice, "Occasionally, parties will condition a deal on
retention of a required list of key employees or a required percentage of employees. Sometimes,
this is coupled with a package of inducements to promote the retention of these employees."
Charles M. Nathan et al., Providing Certainty in the Uncertain World of Telecom Deal Making,
1263 PLI/Corp 173, 180 (September 20, 2001).
182. Epstein, 50 F. 3d at 653. The court described the fact that a representative of Matsushita
contacted MCA, in advance of the transaction, and expressed their desire to retain Wasserman
and Sheinberg as employees after the deal was complete. Id.
183. Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 632.
184. Glover, 4 No. 11 M & A Law. 19. If an acquiring company were able to gain control of
the target company without the acquisition of employee-shareholders' stock, then the tender
offer would not even be necessary for the success of the transaction. Id.
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gained control of the target company with or without the
tendering of employees' shares, because the success of the
transaction would not be contingent upon the success of the
tender offer.
(d) Are the special financial arrangements conditioned on the
success of the tender offer? Similar to the factor of bidder
involvement in payment discussions, the risk of violation in-
creases if the payments are conditioned on the offer's suc-
cess. The best option is for the target company to provide
bonus payments to certain employees, if they are willing to
provide extra services during the acquisition process, re-
gardless of the transaction's eventual success or failure.185
However, a significant weakness of this approach is its lack
of appeal to target companies. Since the payments are
made during the transaction, it is possible that the target
company, having already provided certain bonuses, will be
stuck with the costs of the extra payments if the transaction
is to fail at any point during the negotiations.
(e) Are the negotiations for the special financial arrangements
separate from those relating to the merger agreement? Are
they to occur after the agreement has been signed? It is in
the best interests of the bidder to have the discussions occur
after the signing of the agreement because the company will
then be obligated to go through with the transaction regard-
less of any agreements with target employee shareholders.
If this is the case, it puts the bidder in a better position to
argue that the payments are only incentives designed to re-
tain target employees, rather than payments associated with
the tender offer.
(f) Are agreements to tender included in the special financial
arrangements? Any arrangements that include a require-
ment that the shareholder submit to the tender offer leave
little doubt that there is a direct relationship between the
arrangements and the tender offer-a situation that would
result in an AHBPR violation regardless of the test that is
used. In order to avoid this risk a bidder should never form
agreements that call for both special payments and the
tendering of shares.
Since none of these factors assures protection against tender offer
violations, the only clear answer for potential bidder companies is to
185. Extra services was defined as, "service above and beyond the ordinary call of duty during
the acquisition process." Id.
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either avoid the use of a tender offer or abandon special financial ar-
rangements altogether.
2. Possible Future Solutions
The previous set of solutions are premised on the current state of
tender offer law in the United States, but, ideally, the Supreme Court,
SEC, or Congress will soon address the issue. The hope for the future
is that the Supreme Court will recognize the existing conflict between
the Circuits and will in turn decide on a controlling test or set of
factors.
The wisest decision would be that of either adopting a Bright Line
Test, similar to that used in Lerro, or, at the least, restricting the reach
of the Integral Part and Functional Tests. The adoption of a Bright
Line Test throughout the nation would provide those interested in
tender offers with the stability that is so desperately needed. The
adoption of a Bright Line Test, codified as SEC Rule 14d-2, 186 would
remove the interference of a court's subjective analysis from the prac-
tice of business acquisition transactions. It is contrary to basic notions
of common sense that companies in certain areas of the country are
able to freely engage in tender offers, while those in another region
are forced to act with extreme caution and uncertainty. 187
In the face of today's international economy, all companies must be
allowed to engage in acquisition transactions without the fear of statu-
tory violation. A Bright Line Test controlling tender offers would en-
able this ideal to become a reality and eliminate any guesswork as to
whether special financial arrangements with target employee-share-
holders are permissible or not.
186. SEC Rule 14d-2, codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2, states in pertinent part:
Commencement of a tender offer.
(a) Date of commencement. A bidder will have commenced its tender offer for pur-
poses of section 14(d) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78n) and the rules under that section at
12:01 a.m. on the date when the bidder has first published, sent or given the means to
tender to security holders. For purposes of this section, the means to tender includes
the transmittal form or a statement regarding how the transmittal form may be
obtained.
187. From a comparative law perspective, the U.S. is one of the only developed nations in the
world that fails to provide minority sharehiolders with a right to share in the same control premi-
ums as controlling shareholders. However, many economists agree that it is more efficient to
allow, "privately negotiated transfers at premiums not offered to minority shareholders." John
C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage
Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 359, 360-361 (1996).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The policy behind the creation of the AHBPR-the protection of
all shareholders in the event of a tender offer-is just as important
today as it was back in 1968. Although there are opportunities for
acquiring companies to structure their transactions in a particular
manner, so as to avoid the confusion associated with application of the
AHBPR, it is contrary to the free market system that businesses
should be compelled to do so. The purpose of the Exchange Act and
subsequent securities laws was to provide a level playing field
throughout all types of business transactions. The modern economy,
which is truly a global one in form, is highly competitive and ever
changing. In order for companies to have the ability to succeed, it is
imperative that they be able to freely engage in growth through busi-
ness acquisition transactions, whether they involve tender offers or
not. It is a widely proven fact that the success of many such transac-
tions rests heavily upon the support of those who control the target
companies, which is generally acquired through the use of executive
compensation agreements. As a result of the lack of clarity in the
statutory language, the courts have adopted a series of different and
often conflicting judicial tests for determining AHBPR violations. It
is the duty of the Supreme Court, SEC, and Congress to provide clar-
ity when the laws, as drafted, fail to do so. Other alternatives may
exist, but in light of the modern business world, the adoption of a
Bright Line Test, establishing clear and concise guidelines for the law-
ful execution of tender offers, is necessary for the continued success of
both the U.S. and international economies.
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